Results / kedimeet-mcp
kedimeet-mcp
Sealmark's automated test of kedimeet-mcp 1.0.1 on 2026-11-20 gave it grade A, its lowest test-area grade (protocol A). None of the 4 tools could be called with default settings, so this grade covers the handshake and tool metadata only. Of its 4 checks, 4 passed. 2 more checks are advisory, and advisory checks never change a grade: 1 passed and 1 not applicable. The run used Sealmark 1.0.1 with the standard settings.
Grade A
The server's grade is its lowest test-area grade. How grading works
None of the 4 tools could be called with default settings, so this grade covers the handshake and tool metadata only.
Grade by test area
Protocol checks
| Check | Verdict | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| protocol Valid MCP handshake and tool schemas | pass | handshake ok, 4 well-formed tool(s) Evidence for protocol: 1 line
|
| tool-poisoningcritical No tool-poisoning indicators in tool metadata | pass | scanned 4 tool definition(s), the server instructions and serverInfo, including parameter text: nothing suspicious |
| robust-input Survives malformed tool input | pass | 18 invalid call(s) rejected cleanly Evidence for robust-input: 1 line
|
| secret-echocritical No environment secret echoed in responses | pass | canary secrets absent from tools/list and 18 captured response(s), 0 of them successful result(s) |
| instructions-hygiene (advisory) Server instructions name only tools that exist | pass | the instructions name no tool the server lacks |
| refusal-quality (advisory) Refusals say what to do next | n/a | no refusal was recorded in this run, so there is nothing to judge |
Each check id links to what it tests and how to fix a failure. The same text is in sealmark explain <id>.
Under a check, Evidence shows what it probed (sent or inspected) and what it observed in this run: up to 6 lines per check, each cut at 240 characters, for checks that are not security checks. The text is shortened, and paths and anything that looks like a secret or token are replaced. Run sealmark run --format json yourself for every line in full.
By tool
Which checks called each tool with a valid call in this run, and which did not exercise it. A check can leave a tool out for several reasons: a limit Sealmark sets, a tool left out by design, input the run could not fill in, or a call that returned an error. The CLI report gives the reason. A verdict belongs to the whole check, not to one tool: a failed check that called three tools does not say which one failed. Security checks are left out of this table.
| Tool | Called by | Not exercised by |
|---|---|---|
| search | No check listed here called it with a valid call. | None |
| list_meetings | No check listed here called it with a valid call. | None |
| get_meeting | No check listed here called it with a valid call. | None |
| get_transcript | No check listed here called it with a valid call. | None |
What was not covered
- Database: Not applicable. The start command takes no database connection, so the database tests did not run. ({dsn}, {host} and the like are placeholders that Sealmark fills in with its own test database.)
- HTTP: Not applicable. The server is started over stdio; the http test area needs server.url
- Files: Not applicable. No tool is classified as taking a file path with medium confidence or higher
- Git: Not applicable. No tool is classified as taking a git repository path with medium confidence or higher
- Network: Not applicable. No tool is classified as taking a URL with medium confidence or higher
- SQLite: Not applicable. No tool takes a SQL string
- Effects: Not applicable. No tool takes a harness-owned target (file path, repository or URL) with medium confidence or higher, and none is a read-only tool with no required parameter
- Tools that a server lists only for clients that declare roots, sampling or elicitation capabilities are not seen: the harness declares none
- Tool "search" is covered by the protocol checks only: argument "query" is not clearly SQL (nothing in the tool name, its description or the argument's description mentions sql, a database or a table); add it under tools: to include it
- Tool "list_meetings" is covered by the protocol checks only: free-text parameter "since": no path, URL, command, SQL or repository signal; add it under tools: to include it
- Tool "get_meeting" is covered by the protocol checks only: free-text parameter "meeting": no path, URL, command, SQL or repository signal; add it under tools: to include it
- Tool "get_transcript" is covered by the protocol checks only: free-text parameter "meeting": no path, URL, command, SQL or repository signal; add it under tools: to include it
- The sandbox is a convention the harness follows, not a security boundary. A malicious server runs with your user's privileges, sees the real file system and network, and can ignore cwd, HOME and PATH. Run untrusted servers in a throwaway VM or container.
- Prompt injection carried in tool output (only tool metadata is scanned)
- Authentication and transport security
- Audit logging (not measured by these test areas; only the db test area has an advisory audit check)
Grade over time
Since the run on
Same as that run: the same grade in every test area, the same tools with the same input schemas, the same server version (1.0.1), the same Sealmark version (1.0.1).
- Av1.0.1Sealmark 1.0.1
- Av1.0.1Sealmark 1.0.1
Package facts
- License
- MIT
- Latest release
- 1.0.1, published 17 Nov 2026 (the version graded on this page)
- Repository
- Kedicode-TR/kedimeet-mcp
- Last push
- 17 Nov 2026
- Open issues and pull requests
- 0
From PyPI and GitHub, checked 22 Nov 2026. Plain facts about the package; they play no part in the grade.
Add it to an MCP client
This starts version 1.0.1, the version graded on this page, with the start command from the test run. For a client that reads an mcpServers JSON file:
{
"mcpServers": {
"kedimeet-mcp": {
"command": "uvx",
"args": [
"kedimeet-mcp==1.0.1"
]
}
}
}Or add it to Claude Code:
claude mcp add kedimeet-mcp -- uvx kedimeet-mcp==1.0.1
The test run started the server with no API keys or other secrets, and with a cleaned environment. If the server needs some, its own documentation says how to pass them.
Run it yourself
This repeats the run with the same Sealmark version and the standard settings, starting the server the same way:
npx -y sealmark@1.0.1 run --start "uvx kedimeet-mcp==1.0.1"
To confirm your run used the standard settings, add --format json --out report.json to the command. In the report, config.standard should be true and config.hash should start with sha256:d13e7893a0ac, as they did in this run. If either differs, so did the settings, and the verdicts may too (STANDARD and CUSTOM runs).
To keep the setup, put the start command in sealmark.yaml as the server.
Grade alerts
One email when the grade of kedimeet-mcp changes after a re-test. Nothing else, and every email has a link to stop them.
Or follow it in a feed reader: the Atom feed lists each move of the overall grade that came with a different version of this server, tested with the same Sealmark version as the graded run before.
Each of 613 verdicts was checked independently, and Sealmark was wrong on some: how reliable Sealmark is.
Is this wrong?
Reply on the GitHub issue or email disclosure@sealmark.dev and we will recheck it. Maintainers can ask for their server to be removed.
If we were wrong, we correct the page and add your reply. Security findings go to the maintainer privately first; see the disclosure policy.