Sealmark
Automated re-test on 2026-11-20: not checked by hand, and not yet reviewed by the maintainers.

Results / @certscore/mcp

@certscore/mcp

version tested 0.2.35npmtested 2026-11-20Sealmark 1.0.1methodology 0.3-draftSTANDARD run14 tools

Sealmark's automated test of @certscore/mcp 0.2.35 on 2026-11-20 gave it grade A, its lowest test-area grade (protocol A and network A (provisional)). Only 1 of 14 tools could be called with default settings, so the deeper test areas cover only that tool. Of its 10 checks, 5 passed, 2 inconclusive and 3 not applicable. 3 more checks are advisory, and advisory checks never change a grade: 2 failed and 1 not applicable. The run used Sealmark 1.0.1 with the standard settings.

A

Grade A

The server's grade is its lowest test-area grade. How grading works

Only 1 of 14 tools could be called with default settings, so the deeper test areas cover only that tool.

Grade by test area

A
Protocol4/4 points
A
Network1/1 points · provisional

Protocol checks

CheckVerdictWhat happened
protocol
Valid MCP handshake and tool schemas
pass
handshake ok, 14 well-formed tool(s)
Evidence for protocol: 1 line
  1. Probe initialize + tools/list
    Outcome server certscore 0.2.35 answered; 14 tool(s)
    Decided from the MCP exchange (protocol)
tool-poisoningcritical
No tool-poisoning indicators in tool metadata
pass
scanned 14 tool definition(s), the server instructions and serverInfo, 3 prompt(s) and 4 resource(s), including parameter text: nothing suspicious
robust-input
Survives malformed tool input
pass
65 invalid call(s) rejected cleanly
Evidence for robust-input: 1 line
  1. Probe 65 invalid call(s) across 13 tool(s)
    Outcome all rejected cleanly and the server stayed responsive
    Decided from the MCP exchange (protocol)
secret-echocritical
No environment secret echoed in responses
pass
canary secrets absent from tools/list and 66 captured response(s), 0 of them successful result(s)
instructions-hygiene (advisory)
Server instructions name only tools that exist
fail
the server instructions names 1 tool(s) the server does not offer (scoped_api_key)
refusal-quality (advisory)
Refusals say what to do next
fail
0 of 9 refusal(s) say what to do instead or why retrying will not help (0 %)

Network checks

CheckVerdictWhat happened
net-loopback-ssrfcritical
Refuses loopback targets (SSRF)
pass
all 9 loopback probes were explicitly refused (the response said so) and the listener saw no request or connection, and a hostless URL got a different reply; no fetch of any URL was shown to work (set net.control_url to confirm the tool fetches)
net-scheme-allowlistcritical
Only http(s) schemes accepted
inconclusive
no scheme had an observable effect, but 6 of 6 scored probes were not explicitly refused, so a refusal cannot be told from a tool that cannot fetch at all (a reply that only reports a failed fetch (proxy, socket, DNS) is not read as a refusal; set net.control_url to a URL the tool can reach)
net-caps
Response size and time are capped
n/a
the server refused loopback targets (net-loopback-ssrf passed), so there is no harness-owned URL it will fetch; response size and time caps were not measured
net-redirect
Redirects are re-validated
n/a
the server refused or never reached the loopback listener, so redirect handling could not be observed (a server that blocks loopback cannot be sent a redirect it would follow)

Effects checks

CheckVerdictWhat happened
annotation-honestycritical
Read-only tools change nothing
inconclusive
every control call failed, so the read-only annotation could not be checked
openworld-honesty
Closed-world tools stay on the machine
n/a
no tool declares openWorldHint: false that could be given a harness-owned control argument
undeclared-writes (advisory)
Unannotated tools leave the sandbox unchanged
n/a
every tool carries annotations, nothing to check

Each check id links to what it tests and how to fix a failure. The same text is in sealmark explain <id>.

Under a check, Evidence shows what it probed (sent or inspected) and what it observed in this run: up to 6 lines per check, each cut at 240 characters, for checks that are not security checks. The text is shortened, and paths and anything that looks like a secret or token are replaced. Run sealmark run --format json yourself for every line in full.

By tool

Which checks called each tool with a valid call in this run, and which did not exercise it. A check can leave a tool out for several reasons: a limit Sealmark sets, a tool left out by design, input the run could not fill in, or a call that returned an error. The CLI report gives the reason. A verdict belongs to the whole check, not to one tool: a failed check that called three tools does not say which one failed. Security checks are left out of this table.

ToolCalled byNot exercised by
certscore_get_connection_statusNo check listed here called it with a valid call.
certscore_scan_siteNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_get_scanNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_get_scan_statusNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_get_reportNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_get_evidenceNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_get_report_evidence_pageNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_get_scan_bundleNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_export_findingsNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_list_findingsNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_get_pre_consent_cookies_trackersNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_explain_findingNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_get_latest_domain_scanNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None
certscore_get_latest_domain_pre_consent_cookies_trackersNo check listed here called it with a valid call.None

What was not covered

Grade over time

Since the run on

Same as that run: the same grade in every test area, the same server version (0.2.35), the same Sealmark version (1.0.1).

  1. Av0.2.35Sealmark 1.0.0
  2. Av0.2.35Sealmark 1.0.1
  3. Av0.2.35Sealmark 1.0.1

Package facts

License
proprietary
Latest release
0.2.35, published 7 Nov 2026 (the version graded on this page)
Repository
ergoveritas1-alt/certscore.ai
Last push
22 Nov 2026
Open issues and pull requests
2

From npm and GitHub, checked 22 Nov 2026. Plain facts about the package; they play no part in the grade.

Add it to an MCP client

This starts version 0.2.35, the version graded on this page, with the start command from the test run. For a client that reads an mcpServers JSON file:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "certscore-mcp": {
      "command": "npx",
      "args": [
        "-y",
        "@certscore/mcp@0.2.35"
      ]
    }
  }
}

Or add it to Claude Code:

claude mcp add certscore-mcp -- npx -y "@certscore/mcp@0.2.35"

The test run started the server with no API keys or other secrets, and with a cleaned environment. If the server needs some, its own documentation says how to pass them.

Run it yourself

This repeats the run with the same Sealmark version and the standard settings, starting the server the same way:

npx -y sealmark@1.0.1 run --start "npx -y @certscore/mcp@0.2.35"

To confirm your run used the standard settings, add --format json --out report.json to the command. In the report, config.standard should be true and config.hash should start with sha256:d13e7893a0ac, as they did in this run. If either differs, so did the settings, and the verdicts may too (STANDARD and CUSTOM runs).

To keep the setup, put the start command in sealmark.yaml as the server.

Other servers graded in the same test area, most areas in common first, then by grade.

Grade alerts

One email when the grade of @certscore/mcp changes after a re-test. Nothing else, and every email has a link to stop them.

Or follow it in a feed reader: the Atom feed lists each move of the overall grade that came with a different version of this server, tested with the same Sealmark version as the graded run before.

Each of 613 verdicts was checked independently, and Sealmark was wrong on some: how reliable Sealmark is.

Is this wrong?

Reply on the GitHub issue or email disclosure@sealmark.dev and we will recheck it. Maintainers can ask for their server to be removed.

If we were wrong, we correct the page and add your reply. Security findings go to the maintainer privately first; see the disclosure policy.