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Results / @kazuph/mcp-fetch
@kazuph/mcp-fetch
A
Protocol4/4 points
D
Network3/4 points · capped at Dcritical: net-loopback-ssrf
Coverage: covered (1 of 1 tools reached with a valid call).
Protocol checks
| Check | Verdict | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| protocol Valid MCP handshake and tool schemas | pass | handshake ok, 1 well-formed tool(s) |
| tool-poisoningcritical No tool-poisoning indicators in tool metadata | pass | scanned 1 tool definition(s), including parameter text: nothing suspicious |
| robust-input Survives malformed tool input | pass | 4 invalid call(s) rejected cleanly |
| secret-echocritical No environment secret echoed in responses | pass | canary secrets absent from tools/list and 4 captured response(s) |
Network checks
| Check | Verdict | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| net-loopback-ssrfcritical Refuses loopback targets (SSRF) | fail | imageFetch contacted a loopback listener the harness owns (ipv6, ipv4-mapped): 2 of 9 probes reached it |
| net-scheme-allowlistcritical Only http(s) schemes accepted | pass | 7 probes with file:, ftp:, gopher:, dict:, data: and javascript: URLs had no observable effect (a scheme the HTTP library does not support passes trivially) |
| net-caps Response size and time are capped | pass | size: the reply was 0.00 MiB (limit 16 MiB); time: replied after 12.0 s, inside the 18 s window |
| net-redirect Redirects are re-validated | pass | redirects are followed and the redirect to 127.0.0.1, which the server refused when given directly, was not: the target is re-validated |
What was not covered
- Database: Not applicable. Server config has no {dsn}/{host}/... Placeholder, so the harness cannot start the server once per role
- HTTP: Not applicable. The server is started over stdio; the http pack needs server.url
- Files: Not applicable. No tool is classified as taking a file path with medium confidence or higher
- Git: Not applicable. No tool is classified as taking a git repository path with medium confidence or higher
- SQLite: Not applicable. No tool takes a SQL string
- Effects: Not applicable. No tool declares annotations, so there is nothing to compare with what the sandbox observed
- Tools that a server lists only for clients that declare roots, sampling or elicitation capabilities are not seen: the harness declares none
- SSRF: link-local and private-range addresses are never contacted; redirects from a public host to loopback and DNS rebinding are not tested (the harness contacts only its own loopback listener)
- The sandbox is a convention the harness follows, not a security boundary. A malicious server runs with your user's privileges, sees the real file system and network, and can ignore cwd, HOME and PATH. Run untrusted servers in a throwaway VM or container.
- Prompt injection carried in tool output (only tool metadata is scanned)
- Authentication and transport security
- Audit logging (not measured by these packs; only the db pack has an advisory audit check)
Run it yourself
Started with the standard settings like this; put it in sealmark.yaml as the server:
npx -y @kazuph/mcp-fetch@1.6.3
Each of 613 verdicts was checked independently, and Sealmark was wrong on some: how reliable Sealmark is.
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